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We find that firms with lower excess control rights and other large shareholders face lower collateral
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the preceding characteristics is more pronounced in SOEs. Overall, our research suggests that, in China,
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We examine the effect of corporate governance on the collateral requirements for firms’ bank 
loans in China. We find that firms with lower excess control rights and other large 
shareholders face lower collateral requirements, which is more pronounced in non-SOEs than 
in SOEs. Regarding board characteristics, we find that smaller board size, more independent 
directors, separation of the positions of CEO and chairman, and larger supervisory board size 
can reduce a firm’s use of collateral; the effect of all the preceding characteristics is more 
pronounced in SOEs. Overall, our research suggests that, in China, corporate governance 
structures are able to affect bank lending decisions in respect of collateral requirements, and 
that the influence depends on the controlling shareholder type and associated agency 
problems. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Loan Collateral; Marketization; Ownership 
 
JEL classifications: G21; G34 
                                                          




An evolving literature is beginning to focus on the agency conflicts faced by creditors in 
modern corporations (Anderson et al., 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Boubakri and 
Ghouma, 2010; Lin et al., 2011). In principle, creditors face two types of agency conflict. The 
first is the conflict between creditors and firm managers. The separation between ownership 
and control leads to moral hazard problems and managerial self-serving behaviours, at the 
expense of shareholders and creditors. The second is the conflict between creditors and 
controlling shareholders. In firms with concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders have 
incentives to expropriate other investors, which incentives might be more significant when 
other investors are creditors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Lin et al., 2011). These agency 
conflicts will reduce the expected value of cash flows to the firms and creditors, and increase 
the probability that the firms will face financial distress. As a firm’s financial distress will 
increase the credit risks faced by creditors, creditors will require higher collateral to protect 
their interests in case of default (Menkhoff et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2013).   
Meanwhile, another strand of literature has documented that effective governance 
mechanisms can mitigate the agency conflicts between creditors and manager/controlling 
shareholders, and thereby decrease the probability of financial distress and the associated 
credit risks faced by creditors (Anderson et al., 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). 
Consistent with this view, existing studies with cross-country evidence indicate that 
borrowers with better governance are rewarded with lower collateral requirements (e.g., 
Francis et al., 2012; Ge et al., 2012). However, Larcker et al. (2007) argue that existing 
studies do not show a consensus on the appropriate measurement of corporate governance 
indicators or of the number of corporate governance dimensions. This prompts a question: 
how do various governance mechanisms affect collateral requirements by creditors? In 
particular, the present study investigates the governance mechanisms through which the 
financial distress faced by firms and credit risks faced by creditors can be mitigated.  
To answer this question, the relationship between corporate governance and the use of 
collateral in loan contracts is examined, using a sample of China’s listed firms. This 
examination is motivated by the contrasting views on this subject which currently exist. On 
the one hand, it has been argued that the corporate governance of China’s listed firms is 
designed simply to meet the regulatory requirements of the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC); and Liu (2006) argues that the corporate governance model adopted in 




. On the other hand, a growing number of 
studies are beginning to document that corporate governance has become more effective, 
especially since 2005 when listed firms were required to complete the split-share structure 
reform (Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012; Liu et al., 2015). Thus, it is worthwhile to examine 
whether corporate governance is an effective monitoring mechanism to benefit creditors. In 
addition, rather than relying on the corporate governance index or country-specific 
governance (e.g., Francis et al., 2012; Ge et al., 2012), this paper explores the role of actual 
corporate governance practices within the two-tier board structure. Moreover, we are 
interested in examining the effect of governance, as measured by the excess control rights of 
controlling shareholders and other large shareholder ownership, on the use of collateral. We 
then further investigate how corporate governance interactively works with the ownership 
structure in affecting the use of collateral.  
China’s environment is an excellent laboratory in which to conduct this research for the 
following reasons. Firstly, China’s listed firms exhibit concentrated ownership, and in many 
cases the controlling shareholder is the government, an individual or a family. This indicates 
that the controlling shareholder has substantial control over the firm, and potentially exposes 
creditors to severe expropriation and credit risks. However, the dominant agency conflicts 
vary across different types of owners. In state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the excess control 
rights held by the government are mainly driven by the incentive of the central government 
needing to separate SOEs from political interference and to decentralize decision rights to 
SOE managers (Fan et al., 2013). Nevertheless, insulated from the pyramid’s top owners, 
SOE managers may be induced into severe managerial agency problems; so that creditors 
mainly face agency conflicts with firm management. In non-SOEs, controlling shareholders 
have a strong incentive to enhance their ultimate control through excess control rights, and to 
extract private benefits; while managerial agency problems are mitigated due to the fact that 
controlling shareholders usually have an incentive to monitor managers (Boubakri and 
Ghouma 2010; Cao et al., 2011); thus, creditors usually face agency conflicts with controlling 
shareholders in non-SOEs. Therefore, we are able to assess how better governance 
mechanisms interact with the type of ownership control to prevent financial distress, and how 
the collateral requirements of creditors are determined.  
Secondly, we intend to shed light on the impact that the supervisory board has on the use 
of collateral, which is an important but unexplored aspect of corporate governance; although 
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the supervisory board in China still lacks the power to appoint and dismiss executive 
directors, in contrast to the corporate governance approach in Germany and Japan. Lastly, 
China also provides a unique opportunity for examining collateral requirements because of 
the government’s tight control over interest rates during our sample period, which severely 
limited creditors’ use of loan pricing to differentiate across borrowers with different levels of 
risk (Podpiera, 2006; Koivu, 2009)
2
. In developed markets, lenders are able to price loans 
through both interest rates and pledging collateral, so that they face a potential endogeneity 
issue where ownership structure, corporate governance and collateral requirements might 
have a joint impact on interest rates. This joint setting of interest rates and collateral 
requirements, in most other countries, may contaminate any observed causal relationship 
between ownership structure, corporate governance and collateral requirements. From this 
perspective, because our study is based on China, there will be less concern over endogeneity. 
Briefly, the results reveal that governance mechanisms influence the use of collateral in 
China’s listed firms, but that their effects differ according to ownership structure. Firstly, we 
find that the use of collateral is lower for firms in which controlling shareholders have lower 
excess control rights, or in which other large shareholders have larger ownership; and that 
this relationship is stronger in non-SOEs than in SOEs. In terms of a two-tier board structure, 
the results show that the use of collateral is lower for firms with a smaller board of directors, 
more independent directors, separate chairman and CEO positions, or a larger supervisory 
board; and that this relationship is stronger in SOEs than in non-SOEs. In addition, the 
expertise of the supervisory board helps firms to reduce the use of collateral, which is more 
significant for non-SOEs. These results confirm that different property rights and dominant 
agency problems exist between SOEs and non-SOEs. Therefore, internal corporate 
governance, such as a two-tier board structure, is more effective in reducing the use of 
collateral, by constraining the agency conflicts between creditors and management, in SOEs; 
while governance by other blockholders is more effective in reducing the use of collateral, by 
alleviating agency conflicts between creditors and controlling shareholders, in non-SOEs.  
This research contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, fresh evidence proving 
how internal governance affects firms’ use of collateral has here been presented. Extant 
evidence shows that corporate governance can prevent controlling shareholders from 
tunnelling, and can increase firm value (e.g. Bai et al., 2004). This research extends the 
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 This situation confirms the view that collateral is used to protect banks’ interests from defaulting by borrowers. 
This also addresses the alternative view that high-quality borrowers are likely to pledge more collateral to enjoy 
a lower interest rate (Besanko and Thakor, 1987), because regulation of interest rates in China prevents them 
from doing this.   
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literature by providing evidence that, when designing loan contracts, banks consider how 
internal governance can reduce their credit risks. Moreover, in a departure from the study by 
An et al. (2014), who examined the effect of ownership structure on the use of collateral, we 
move further to investigate how corporate governance interacts with ownership structure in 
affecting the use of collateral. Thus, we provide a complementary perspective to their study. 
Secondly, our study provides additional evidence regarding the effectiveness of 
governance by a two-tier board system. This is a structure that consists of a board of directors 
and a supervisory board, and is a typical feature of the German and Japanese governance 
systems. Although Chinese supervisory boards resemble the German and Japanese 
governance structure, they have evolved over a relatively short period. Thus, the 
effectiveness in China of this two-tier board system remains an empirical question. Our 
results suggest that both the board of directors and the supervisory board are able to exert 
effective monitoring over the management and reduce the credit risks, thus reducing the use 
of collateral.   
Finally, this paper also provides evidence of the determinants of collateral requirements 
in emerging markets. Menkhoff et al. (2006) and Menkhoff et al. (2012) find that the need for 
collateral is higher in less developed markets, and that borrowers can overcome the threat of a 
lack of collateral by substitutes such as third party guarantees and banking relationship. This 
paper complements their studies, and provides evidence of the effects of governance 
mechanisms, in Chinese listed firms, on the collateral required by banks; and that these 
effects are dependent on the type of ownership structure a firm has and its dominant agency 
problems. 
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the Chinese 
institutional environment and then develops the hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the data and 
methodology. Section 4 reports the results of the empirical analyses. Section 5 provides 
additional tests; and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2 Institutional background and hypothesis development 
2.1 Institutional background 
2.1.1 Ownership structure 
China began its transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy in 
1978. Under the communist system, China’s governments collected revenue from SOEs and 
provided financing to those firms out of the state budget, so there was no need for risk 
management by banks in the use of collateral. When SOE reform began, the government tried 
to give autonomy to SOEs by linking rewards to performance and relinquishing its 
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shareholding. That was followed, in the early 1980s, by the adoption of the “loan for (fiscal) 
grant” (bo gai dai) scheme, which aimed at increasing financial incentives and hardening the 
budget constraints faced by SOEs. A new phase of reform began in 1984, when the 
separation between management and ownership was further emphasized. In 1993, a new goal 
of establishing a modern enterprise system was set for SOE reform, which resulted in many 
SOEs being restructured into joint stock companies and being listed on the stock exchanges 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen, with shares sold to the public. However, governments at various 
levels still retained enough shares to exercise control. Some of the equity carved out of SOEs 
is now majority-owned by private investors, and there is a growing number of private firms 
that are now listed. During our sample period, non-SOEs comprise 44% of the sample. 
Another characteristic of Chinese firms is that they usually have controlling 
shareholders. In some cases, the controlling shareholders own the firms directly as the largest 
shareholders. In other cases, controlling shareholders establish a pyramidal structure and own 
firms through the chain of ownership indirectly. In these firms, the control rights of the 
controlling shareholders are measured as the weakest link in the chain of ownership, and cash 
flow rights are measured by the product of ownership along the chain. For example, 
controlling shareholder (firm A) owns 70% of the shares in firm B, which in turn owns 50% 
of the shares in firm C. In this sense, firm A is the controlling shareholder of firm C. The 
controlling shareholder (firm A) owns 50% of control rights (which is its ownership) and 
35% of cash flow rights of firm C, while the largest shareholder of firm C is firm B, which 
has 50% of ownership of firm C. In this case, the controlling shareholder’s ownership is the 
same as that of the largest shareholder. In some other cases, the controlling shareholder’s 
ownership can be different from the largest shareholder’s ownership
3
. During our sample 
period, it was revealed that, on average, the controlling shareholder owns 37.1% of a firm, the 
largest shareholder owns 36.6% of a firm, and the second largest shareholder owns 8.46% of 
a firm; which indicates that the controlling shareholder has substantial control over the firm. 
In line with recent literature, we investigate the influence of corporate governance on the 
collateral requirements of China’s listed companies, and how these effects vary based on the 
type of controlling shareholders.  
2.1.2 Two-tier board structure 
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 One example of this is that firm A owns 40% of the shares in firm B, which in turn owns 50% of the shares in 
firm C. In this case, the controlling shareholder of firm C is firm A, which owns 40% of firm C. Another 
example is that firm A owns 70% of shares in both firm B and firm C, which are both shareholders of firm D, 
with 40% ownership. In this case, the controlling shareholder of firm D is firm A, which owns 80% ownership 
of firm D. 
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These listed firms are governed by two-tier boards that are similar to the German and 
Japanese corporate governance approach, and consist of a supervisory board and a board of 
directors. The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Firms in China, published by the 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), expanded on Company Law by 
specifying the duties and responsibilities of directors in greater detail. Following this 
guideline, the board of directors was made accountable to shareholders, and was instructed to 
treat all shareholders equally and to take care of the interests of the firm’s various 
stakeholders. In 2001, the independent director system was mandated by the CSRC, which 
required that at least one third of the board members of listed firms should be independent 
directors by June 30, 2003. The CSRC also strongly encouraged firms to separate the roles of 
chairman and CEO. However, China introduced the concept and culture of the modern 
corporation while extending the reforms of the state-owned economy. Although the 
responsibilities and duties of directors closely paralleled those in the West, it is doubtful 
whether they played a positive governance role in China, because the Chinese laws and 
guidelines are silent on who must propose directors; so that, in practice, large owners tend to 
appoint directors and their representatives to dominate the board (Wu et al., 2009). 
According to Company Law, a listed company must also have a supervisory board that 
consists of no less than three members, including representatives of the shareholders of the 
company’s employees and workers. According to Company Law, the supervisory board 
mainly carries out financial monitoring functions, which include examining the company’s 
financial status and supervising the actions of the directors and managers to prevent any 
violations of laws, regulations, or the company’s by-laws. It also states that supervisory 
members should have professional knowledge and work experience in accounting and law. A 
key difference between a board of directors and a supervisory board is that supervisors of the 
company cannot concurrently serve as its directors, managers, or financial officers, so that 
they are expected to oversee the performance of the directors and senior management in a 
relatively impartial manner (Dahya et al., 2003; Firth et al., 2007a, b; Ding et al., 2009 and 
Ding et al. (2010).  
Although the supervisory board in China still lacks the power to appoint and dismiss 
executive directors, unlike in the German and Japanese approach to corporate governance, the 
latest Company Law Amendment 2005 largely addresses several important constraints that 
prevented supervisory boards from functioning properly. Firstly, supervisory boards now do 
have the power to recommend the dismissal of directors and members of top management 
who have been convicted of crimes, and to sue directors and members of top management 
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who commit fraud. Secondly, supervisors were already allowed to attend board meetings; but 
the latest amendment gives them the right to ask questions and make suggestions. 
Furthermore, supervisory boards now have the right to submit proposals to shareholder 
meetings. Finally, when the board of supervisors discovers something unusual in the 
operation of the company, it can conduct an investigation into the operating situation, with 
the company bearing the expense.  
Overall, the present paper adds to the literature by means of a detailed investigation of 
the impact of internal governance on collateral requirements, which has not been previously 
examined.  
2.1.3 Banking structure and bank lending policies 
In the early 1980s, the government established four wholly state-owned banks (the Big Four), 
which took control of all the lending functions of the People’s Bank of China (the central 
bank). Later, in 1994, three wholly state-owned policy banks were established and took over 
policy lending from the Big Four banks. By 1996, joint stock commercial banks and city 
banks had begun to emerge. 
Originally, bank loans mainly took the form of credit loans granted at low interest rates 
and without any guarantees or collateral. This, among other factors, resulted in a higher ratio 
of non-performing loans (NPLs). As the market-oriented economy developed, banks became 
increasingly aware of loan risk, and from the 1990s they increasingly demanded guarantees 
or collateral. Indeed, according to a survey of 13 domestic banks between 2000 and 2005, the 
average collateral for secured loans – of which land or buildings became the most acceptable 
form – increased from 22% to 32% of all loans granted (Yang and Qian, 2008). Banks also 
demanded the equivalent value of fixed assets as collateral before granting loans, especially 
to privately controlled firms (Yeung, 2009). Meanwhile, before March 1998, the People’s 
Bank of China recommended the interest rate for lending by commercial banks, and allowed 
fluctuations around this recommended standard rate. Later, in October 2004, the ceiling rate 
was relaxed, but the floor on lending rates remains in place. It was not until July 20, 2013, 
following further interest rate reform, that the Chinese Central Bank freed up interest rates; 
and since then commercial banks have acquired much greater autonomy in setting lending 
and deposit rates.   
In addition, there was discrimination in bank loans in favour of SOEs relative to private 
firms (Cull and Xu, 2003), with state-owned banks often lending to SOEs for political, 
employment and taxation purposes rather than for profitability (Brandt and Li, 2003). As 
Yeung (2009) discusses, for these banks (the Big Four SOCBs, policy banks, joint stock 
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commercial banks, and city banks), the decision of whether to grant loans was often 
determined by unofficial assessment criteria and majority state ownership of financial 
systems. SOEs tended to receive loans from the Big Four banks because of their state 
ownership, without pledging the necessary collateral; while private firms were expected to 
pledge collateral by securing their fixed assets to the equivalent value of the collateral 
required. This was a rational decision made by banks to bias their lending against private 
firms, based on the higher risks involved and higher costs of transaction and risk evaluation.  
Since the economic reform of 1978, the evolution of the private sector in China has been 
significant. According to the Bureau of Statistics, up until December 2011 the output of the 
private sector accounted for more than 50% of GDP and provided more than 90% of the job 
opportunities; but discrimination against lending to private firms in China, as described 
above, has limited the growth of bank loans to private firms (Li et al., 2008). Extant literature 
investigates the lending practices towards private firms in China, and argues that poor 
profitability and higher credit risks among private firms are the main reasons for 
discrimination in bank loans and loan standards (Brandt and Li, 2003; Firth et al., 2009).    
When making lending decisions, banks are also concerned about borrowers’ governance 
structure, as better governance structure is effective in protecting the interests of banks. 
Specifically, at the G20/OECD forum on April 10, 2015, Mr Yao Feng, the vice president of 
the China Association for Public Companies (CAPCO), emphasized that the governance 
structure of listed firms has been improved and is effective in protecting the interests of all 
investors
4
. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that loan officers are concerned about the 
governance structure of borrowers even after collateral loans are granted
5
; and that a better 
governance structure helps firms to obtain loans with lower collateral requirements
6
. 
2.2 Development of hypotheses  
In this section, we discuss how different aspects of corporate governance affect the use of 
collateral; and we particularly focus on ownership structure and the two-tier board structure 
as proxies for corporate governance.   
One feature of ownership structure in China is the existence of a controlling shareholder 
through a pyramidal structure. As noted by existing studies, these controlling shareholders 
hold significant control rights in excess of cash flow rights; and this divergence between 
control rights and cash flow rights induces moral hazards and adverse selection activities by 
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controlling shareholders (Cleassens et al., 2002). Controlling shareholders may use their 
powerful position to extract resources for their private benefit at the cost of other investors, 
while suffering limited consequences for such behaviour; and this incentive to expropriate 
other investors becomes more severe when controlling shareholders’ excess control rights 
become larger (Lin et al., 2011). This severe expropriation will result in a higher probability 
of financial distress or bankruptcy, as well as associated costs; all of which are detrimental to 
creditors. As creditors face higher credit risks, and incorporate this expectation into their 
lending decisions, they are more likely to use higher requirements as a protection against the 
possibility of a borrower defaulting.  
Another feature of ownership structure in China is the existence of multiple large 
shareholders. Noticing that controlling shareholders have an incentive to practise 
expropriation, existing studies have suggested that a structure involving multiple large 
shareholders is effective in mitigating such behaviour, because these large shareholders may 
compete for control and monitor the controlling shareholders (Bennedsen and Wolfenson, 
2000; Laeven and Levine, 2008). An active takeover market does not exist in China; but 
other large shareholders, apart from the controlling shareholder, can challenge opportunistic 
controlling shareholders. Other large shareholders may constitute a serious obstacle to 
expropriation activities by the controlling shareholder because of their desire to protect their 
own interests and reduce the probability of financial distress (Berkman et al., 2009; 
Huybhebaert and Wang, 2012; Yeh and Woidtke, 2005). In the case of presence of multiple 
large shareholders, banks will face lower credit risks and thus require lower collateral.   
Furthermore, expropriation by a controlling shareholder is more evident in non-SOEs. In 
these firms, the controlling shareholder is usually an individual or a family, who uses the 
pyramid structure to enhance their ultimate control and extract resources for their private 
benefit, so that the main agency conflicts faced by banks involve the controlling shareholders. 
Consequently, banks will require higher collateral for non-SOEs with higher excess control 
rights or with lower ownership by multiple large shareholders. However, in the case of SOEs, 
Fan et al. (2013) argue that the excess control rights of the government mainly results from 
the intention of the government to decentralize decision rights to firm managers, and to 
reduce government interference as well as political costs; thus self-dealing behaviour by 
managers becomes more severe and banks face agency conflicts with management. 
Therefore, the influence of excess control rights and ownership by multiple large 
shareholders on the use of collateral is weaker in SOEs. Thus we form the following 
hypotheses:   
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H1a: Excess control rights are positively related to the use of collateral, and this positive 
relationship is more pronounced in non-SOEs than in SOEs. 
H1b: Ownership by multiple large shareholders is negatively related to the use of 
collateral, and this negative relationship is more pronounced in non-SOEs than in SOEs. 
We next consider the effect of the two-tier board structure. In terms of the board of 
directors, board size is one of the factors that affect the effectiveness of the board’s 
monitoring function. Compared to small boards, large boards are less effective in 
communication and more likely to be controlled by powerful shareholders (Yermack, 1996). 
Firth et al. (2007a) also argue that a large board may reduce the informativeness of earnings, 
which decreases its ability to monitor the management. In this sense, banks may consider that 
firms with larger boards lose their ability to exert efficient monitoring, causing a higher credit 
risk, so that creditors are more likely to require them to pledge higher collateral.  
In addition, agency theorists consider a board’s independence to be a crucial aspect of its 
monitoring role, which serves the best interests of other investors (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Liu et al., 2015). In the context of China, independent directors are supposed to ensure that 
financial decisions are made to maximize firm value and should not result in earnings or cash 
flows that are biased toward the controlling shareholders (CSRC, 2002). Independent 
directors are thus expected to promote good governance, due to their positive behavioural 
motivation and reputation concern (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shan and McIver, 2011; Shan, 
2013), and to be effective in mitigating opportunistic behaviour by management (Liu et al., 
2015). Thus, board independence is able to protect firms from financial distress and reduce 
the credit risk faced by banks, and in turn reduce the use of collateral.  
Existing studies have also documented that separating the positions of CEO and 
chairman can increase the effectiveness of the board’s monitoring of management. Liu and 
Lu (2007) provide empirical evidence that the effectiveness of board monitoring becomes 
weaker when the CEO is also the chairman. Accordingly, if firms have a dual CEO and 
chairman, managerial self-dealing behaviour will be more severe, which leads to a higher 
probability of financial distress and credit risks, and to the need for firms to pledge more 
collateral to obtain loans.  
As the characteristics of the board are associated with the monitoring of managerial 
behaviour, based on our discussion above about the dominant agency conflicts between SOEs 
and non-SOEs, we form the following hypotheses: 
H2a: Board size is positively associated with the use of collateral, and this positive 
relationship is more pronounced in SOEs than in non-SOEs.  
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H2b: The proportion of independent directors is negatively associated with the use of 
collateral, and this negative relationship is more pronounced in SOEs than in non-SOEs. 
H2c: Having a dual CEO/chairman is positively associated with the use of collateral, 
and this positive relationship is more pronounced in SOEs than in non-SOEs. 
The existence of both a board of directors and a supervisory board in China is usually 
referred as a two-tier board structure. According to the Company Law (2003), the main 
objective of the supervisory board is to examine the financial statements and monitor the 
behaviour of executives and directors of boards, which may help to improve the quality of 
firms’ accounting. Unlike boards of directors, the supervisory boards represent firm workers 
and minority shareholders, who are free of the control of controlling shareholders; and 
executives or directors cannot be members of the supervisory boards. In this sense, a larger 
supervisory board is more likely to successfully protect the interests of stakeholders, and 
these stakeholders value supervisory boards and appreciate their activities. In particular, Firth 
et al. (2007a) show that large supervisory boards result in an improvement in the quality of 
accounting information. If the large supervisory board of a borrower can effectively exercise 
its monitoring role and decrease the credit risks faced by banks, it is then expected to reduce 
the use of collateral in their loan contracts.  
Furthermore, the professional knowledge and working experience of supervisors in areas 
such as law and accounting should be able to improve the governance of a supervisory board. 
Dahya et al. (2003) point out that supervisors are expected to have the necessary 
competencies in terms of knowledge and experience to perform their monitoring role. If a 
supervisory board that has more supervisors with the appropriate professional knowledge or 
working experience improves corporate governance, this is expected to reduce credit risk and 
to be negatively related to the use of collateral.  
As the supervisory board is able to exert monitoring over the management, we expect 
that the effect of the characteristics of the supervisory board on the use of collateral will be 
more pronounced in SOEs. Therefore, we form the following hypotheses:  
H3a: Supervisory board size is negatively associated with the use of collateral, and this 
negative relationship is more pronounced in SOEs than in non-SOEs.  
H3b: The proportion of supervisors with professional knowledge or working experience 
on the supervisory board is negatively associated with the use of collateral, and this negative 
relationship is more pronounced in SOEs than in non-SOEs. 
3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Sample selection 
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The initial sample consists of all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
for the years 2007 to 2009. The bank loan sample is manually collected from the footnotes of 
the annual reports of listed firms. To be included in the sample, the footnote should contain 
detailed information on the bank loans, such as loan maturity (long term or short term), the 
type of bank loan (guaranteed, collateralized, or unsecured), and the amount of loans for each 
type. The present research also used the annual reports to identify the professional 
supervisors. Other corporate financial data used in this research are gathered from the China 
Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.  
Initially, there are 4,969 firm-year observations available on the CSMAR database from 
2007 to 2009. Table 1 describes the sample selection process. First, 523 observations with no 
outstanding loans were eliminated; and of the remaining 4,446 observations, 18 observations 
in the financial industry were deleted. Then 109 observations were eliminated because the 
type of bank loan cannot be identified in the financial reports; and a further 170 observations 
with insufficient data to calculate financial data were also deleted. Moreover, an additional 
387 ST or *ST firm-year observations
7
 were also eliminated, as were 568 observations that 
had insufficient data to calculate corporate governance data. The final sample consisted of 
3,194 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2009. In addition, as we use the one-year lagged 
value of all independent variables for the empirical analysis, we also collected data for these 
independent variables for 2006, which includes 3,194 firm-year observations.   
Table 1. Sample selection process 
Sample selection Observations 
Firm-year observations from 2007 to 2009 4,969 
Less:  
Firms without outstanding loans 523 
Firms from financial industry 18 
Type of loan cannot be identified 109 
Firms with missing information 170+568 
Firms flagged with ST or *ST 387 
Total observations 3,194 
 
3.2 Estimation model and variable definition 
According to the hypotheses presented in the previous section, this research estimates the 
following models for regression analysis: 
                                                          
7
 ST stands for Special Treatment, and refers to the listed firms that have already had negative net profits for two 
consecutive years. *ST refers to the listed firms that have already had negative net profits for three consecutive 
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 (1) 
where Collateral is the percentage of total loans collateralized for firm i in year t. In the 
empirical analysis, we use the percentage of collateralized loans over total loans outstanding 
as a measure for firms’ use of collateral, which is consistent with Chen et al. (2013)
8
. In 
particular, the amount of collateralized loans is the sum of both pledged loans and mortgage 
loans, and firms’ use of collateral is defined as follows: 
Collateral = Collateralized loans / Total loans outstanding 
Governance represents a set of variables that we employ as the proxies for ownership 
and governance. To test our main hypotheses, we include each of these variables in equation 
(1) separately. In particular, the proxies for ownership include NonSOE, Execss and Top2_10. 
NonSOE is a dummy variable equal to 1 for non-SOEs and 0 for SOEs. Consistent with Chen 
et al. (2011), a firm is identified as a non-SOE when its controlling shareholder is an 
individual or a non-state entity, and other firms are defined as SOEs. Excess is the deviation 
between control rights and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders, consistent with 
Claessens et al. (2002). Top2_10 is the percentage of shares held by the second to the tenth 
largest shareholders.  
We measure the two-tier board structure governance by looking at five aspects: Board is 
the log of the total number of directors on the board; Indep is the ratio of independent 
directors to the total number of directors on the board; Duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the CEO is also the chairman and 0 otherwise; SBsize is the log of the number of 
supervisors on the supervisory board; SBexpert is the ratio of supervisors on the supervisory 
board with professional knowledge or work experience in areas such as law and accounting. 
In line with existing studies (Menkhoff et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013), a set of control 
variables, as well as year and industry fixed effects, are also included in the regression; and 
the detailed information and definitions of all variables used in this study are presented in 
Table 2 below.  
Table 2. Variable definition 
Variable Definition 
Collateral The percentage of total loans that are collateralized 
NonSOE A dummy variable equal to 1 for non-SOEs and 0 otherwise. 
                                                          
8
 As argued by Chen et al. (2013), the ideal proxy for the use of collateral is to incorporate the information on 
collateral value. However, due to the unavailability of this information, we follow Chen et al. (2013) and use the 
collateral loan ratio as the proxy in this study. 
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Excess Control-ownership deviation by the controlling shareholder 
Top2_10 The sum of ownership held by the second to the 10th largest shareholders 
Board size (Board) Log of the total number of directors on the board 
Independence (Indep) The percentage of independent directors on the board 
Duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board 
SB size Log of the total number of members on the supervisory board 
SB expertise The percentage of supervisors on the supervisory board who have 
professional knowledge or work experience in areas such as law and 
accounting  
Ownership Ownership held by the largest shareholder 
Guarantee Percentage of total loans that are guaranteed  
Firm size (Size) Log of firm total assets 
Abnormal earnings (AE) Earnings per share in year t+1 minus earnings per share in year t, divided by 
the share price in year t 
B/M Book to market value 
Return on assets (ROA) Net income / Total assets 
Leverage Total debts / Total assets 
LDebt Long-term debt / Total loans 
Tangibility Fixed assets / Total assets 
Liquidity Cash and cash equivalents / Total assets 
Age The log of the years since firm is established 
Sales Total sales / Total assets 
Segment The number of business segments 
 
3.3 Estimation methods 
In the empirical analysis, one concern about our estimation on the relationship between 
corporate governance, ownership structure, and the use of collateral, is the issue of 
endogeneity. For example, firms required by banks to provide higher collateral may have the 
incentive to adjust their ownership structure or board structure, suggesting the existence of 
reverse causality. To address this issue, we use a simultaneous equation system in which the 
use of collateral, ownership structure, and board structures are endogenously determined. In 
addition, since firm profitability and guaranteed loans can also be endogenously determined 
by a set of control variables similar to that used in the collateral equation, we further include 
two equations in our simultaneous equation system where firm profitability and guaranteed 



















              



















              





















                
                
























                  
                  




























                     
                     
                     



















            
               (7) 
In each of the above equations, other endogenous variables are included as independent 
variables to account for reverse causality. Following the discussion by Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008), instrument variables for each endogenous variable are also included in the equations. 
Specifically: Segment, defined as the number of business segments, is used as the instrument 
variable in equation (2); Age, defined as the log of years since firm was established, is used as 
the instrument variable in equation (3); Excessmean, defined as the industry average Excess, 
is used as the instrument variable in equation (4); Topmean, defined as the industry average 
Top2_10, is used as the instrument variable in equation (5); LagGuarantee, defined as the 
lagged guaranteed loan, is used as the instrument variable in equation (6); and LagROA, 
defined as the lagged ROA, is used as the instrument variable in equation (7). The selection of 
these instrument variables is motivated by existing empirical studies (Linck et al., 2008; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009; Lin et al., 2011). In the next section, where we conduct the 
regression analysis to examine the effects of corporate governance on the use of collateral, 
the simultaneous equation systems include the equations where the use of collateral and the 
relevant corporate governance variables are treated endogenously. These simultaneous 
equation systems are estimated using the three-stage least square (3SLS) method, which takes 
the cross-equation error correlation into account to improve the estimation efficiency of a 
large sample. We also conduct over-identification tests (reporting p-values) to examine the 
validity of the instrument variables.  
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Moreover, borrowers with a certain ownership structure and board structure might have 
other firm-specific characteristics, unaccounted for in our model, that affect ownership 
structure, board structure and the use of collateral jointly, and may bias our results. Although 
it is difficult to rule out the endogeneity issue completely, we address this issue in two ways, 
by estimating equation (1) using both the firm fixed effect model and system GMM. In 
particular, the firm fixed effect/GMM allows us to account for time-invariant, common 
unobservable or omitted firm-specific characteristics that might affect ownership structure, 
board structure, and the use of collateral.  
To save space and focus on our main discussion, we report only the estimation results of 
equation (1) of our simultaneous equation system; and estimation results of other equations 
are available upon request
9
. We also report the estimation results of equation (1) using the 
firm fixed effect and system GMM for robustness.  
 
3.4 Summary statistics 
Table 3 lists the summary statistics of variables for the full sample. Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics on the use of collateral; Panels B and C show the characteristics of 
ownership structure and corporate governance proxies; and Panel D presents the summary 
statistics of control variables to be used in the regression analysis. Panel A shows that, on 
average, about 36% of total loans require collateral. As Panel B shows, non-SOEs comprise 
44.3% of the sample. In addition, Panel B shows that the average excess control right is 
6.2%, and that other large shareholders are holding 19.2% of ownership. Panel C shows that 
the average board size was 9.2 and the median was 9; while the proportion of independent 
directors on the board has a mean of 38.3%; and about 15.9% of the CEOs were also the 
chairman of the board. Panel C also shows that the average (median) of supervisory board 
size is 3.9 (3), and that the proportion of supervisors on the supervisory board with 
professional knowledge or work experience has a mean of 20.0%.  
Table 3. Summary statistics 




  Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Collateral loan ratio 
Collateral 3194 36.0% 27.1% 0 1 34.2% 
Panel B: Ownership structure 
NonSOE 3194 44.3% 0 0 1 50.3% 
Excess 3194 6.2% 0 0 23.1% 8.6% 
Top2_10 3194 19.2% 17.0% 2.5% 43.4% 13.0% 
Panel C: Corporate governance 
Board 3194 9.2 9 6 13 1.9 
                                                          
9
 For readers’ reference, we present the estimation results of other equations in the Appendix. These equations 
correspond to the collateral equation in column 6 of Table 6, where we consider all endogenous variables.  
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Indep 3194 38.3% 33.3% 33.3% 55.6% 9.4% 
Duality 3194 15.9% 0 0 1 36.6% 
SB size 3194 3.9 3 3 6 1.3 
SB expertise 3194 20.0% 20.0% 0 66.7% 21.4% 
Panel D: Control variables 
Ownership 3194 35.53% 33.48% 13.93% 62.38% 15.22% 
Guarantee 3194 39.7% 35.8% 0 1 33.8% 
Size 3194 21.6 21.5 20.1 23.5 1.1 
AE 3194 0.3% 0 -5.2% 7.5% 6.6% 
B/M 3194 53.0% 48.2% 18.0% 102.9% 26.2% 
ROA 3194 3.4% 3.5% -6.4% 12.4% 8.7% 
Leverage 3194 24.0% 23.2% 2.3% 48.7% 14.4% 
LDebt 3194 30.3% 20.2% 0 96.5% 31.7% 
Tangibility 3194 27.8% 24.8% 1.9% 61.8% 18.5% 
Liquidity 3194 16.7% 13.7% 2.9% 40.0% 12.3% 
 
4 Empirical results   
4.1 Univariate tests 
To provide some preliminary information, Table 4 presents univariate comparisons of the 
collateralized loan ratio as well as of ownership and governance characteristics of SOEs and 
non-SOEs. Firstly, the average collateralized loan ratio is 28.7% for SOEs, which is 
significantly lower than the 45.1% for non-SOEs. In addition, the excess control rights of the 
controlling shareholder in non-SOEs are significantly higher than in SOEs. The results also 
clearly suggest that non-SOEs have more concentrated ownership by other large 
shareholders, with an average of 22.9%, while the average is 16.3% for SOEs. In terms of a 
two-tier board structure, the average board size in firms controlled by SOEs is 9.6, which is 
significantly larger than the 8.8 for non-SOEs. Table 4 also shows that the SOEs are less 
likely to have a dual CEO/chairman, with an average of 10.5%, while the average for non-
SOEs was 22.8%. In addition, SOEs have a similar proportion of independent directors to 
non-SOEs, with means of 38.1% and 38.5%, respectively. In terms of a supervisory board, 
the non-SOEs have a significantly smaller supervisory board, with a size of 3.6 persons, 
while SOEs have a typical size of 4.3 persons on average. In addition, non-SOEs have a 
smaller proportion of supervisors with professional knowledge or work experience on the 
supervisory board than do SOEs, with an average of 17.3% and 22.2%, respectively.  
Overall, this section finds that the governance characteristics differed across firms 
classified by types of controlling shareholders. Thus, in the following empirical analysis, we 
are also interested in examining the effects of ownership structure and corporate governance 
on the use of collateral in SOEs and non-SOEs.  
Table 4. Univariate tests between SOEs and non-SOEs 
Variables SOEs Non-SOEs Difference (t-test) 
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Collateral 28.7% 45.1% 16.37%***(13.68) 
Excess 3.7% 9.3% 5.62%***(9.10) 
Top2_10 16.3% 22.9% 6.6%***(14.66) 
Board size 9.6 8.8 -0.8***(-12.30) 
Independence 38.1% 38.5% 0.4%(1.31) 
Duality 10.5% 22.8% -12.3%***(9.27) 
SB size 4.3 3.6 -0.7***(-15.37) 
SB expertise 22.2% 17.3% -4.9%***(-6.48) 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
 
4.2 Multivariate tests 
4.2.1 Ownership governance and the use of collateral 
Before running the regressions, the correlation matrix and the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
are checked; and this shows that absolute values of all the correlation coefficients are less 
than 0.397 and the VIF is less than 2.57 for all the regressions (untabulated), which implies 
that multi-collineality would not be a critical issue here.  
Table 5 provides the empirical results of the collateral equation from our simultaneous 
equation system on the association between ownership and the use of collateral. In columns 1 
and 2, we consider the influence of Excess and Top2_10 separately. The results in column 1 
show that the estimated coefficient of Excess is 0.10, which is statistically significant at the 
5% level (t-value is 2.04). We also observe that the coefficient of Excess*NonSOE is positive 
and statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.08). These results support our 
hypothesis H1a, that the larger control-ownership wedge of the controlling shareholders is 
expected to be associated with a higher risk of expropriation and higher collateral 
requirements by banks; and that this effect is more pronounced in non-SOEs. In addition, 
higher concentration of ownership held by other large shareholders is able to reduce the risk 
of expropriation and thus reduce the use of collateral in their loan contracts.  
In column 2 we consider the effect of ownership concentration held by other large 
shareholders on the use of collateral. Specifically, we find that the estimated coefficients of 
Top2_10 and Top2_10*NonSOE are -0.50 and -0.28, with both significant at the 1% levels (t-
values are -6.76 and -2.86, respectively).These results are consistent with our expectation and 
support our hypothesis H1b, that ownership by other large shareholders will mitigate the risk 
of expropriation and lead to lower collateral requirements; and that this mitigating effect is 
more significant in non-SOEs. In the last column, we put both variables together, and the 
estimated results are quite similar to those reported in both columns 1 and 2.    
We also observe that the estimated coefficient of NonSOE in column 1 is 0.16, 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that the use of collateral is significantly higher for non-
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SOEs than for SOEs. This result is consistent with An et al. (2014). The estimated 
coefficients of some control variables exhibit the expected signs. For example, there is a 
negative association between the guarantee requirements (Guarantee) and the use of 
collateral; which suggests that a loan guarantee acts like a collateral substitute and allows a 
lender to enforce collateral-free loans. The likelihood of using collateral also decreases with 
the size of the borrower (Size), firm profitability (ROA), tangibility (Tangibility), and 
liquidity (Liquidity); which is consistent with Almeida and Campello (2007). In addition, the 
leverage levels (Leverage) and term structure (LDebt) are both positively related to the use of 
collateral. The present research finds no strong support for the signalling hypothesis, because 
the relevant variable (AE) shows a negative sign, which is different from Barclay and Smith 
(1995). This research also does not find a postulated positive relationship between growth 
opportunities (B/M) and the proportion of secured debt. Given an inverse relationship 
between growth opportunities and indebtedness in the Chinese context (Bhabra et al., 2008), 
an inverse relationship between the former and the secured debt ratio may be interpreted as a 
general tendency for growing firms to decrease the size of debt financing, especially 
collateralized loans. 
Table 5. Effect of ownership on the use of collateral 
Dependent variable               Collateralized loan ratio 
 1 2 3 
Excess 0.10**(2.04)  0.08*(1.83) 
Excess*NonSOE 0.15**(2.08)  0.03**(2.18) 
Top2_10  -0.50***(-6.76) -0.22***(-2.88) 
Top2_10*NonSOE  -0.28***(-2.86) -0.30***(-3.01) 
NonSOE 0.16***(9.50) 0.23***(9.96) 0.24***(8.66) 
Ownership -0.18***(-4.11) -0.28***(-6.12) -0.27***(-5.88) 
Guarantee -0.67***(-33.69) -0.67***(-34.38) -0.67***(-34.13) 
Size -0.09***(-11.62) -0.09***(-11.77) -0.09***(-11.74) 
AE -0.36***(-3.59) -0.33***(-3.29) -0.33***(-3.30) 
B/M 0.10***(3.70) 0.08***(3.04) 0.08***(3.04) 
ROA -0.64***(-6.19) -0.53***(-5.23) -0.53***(-5.20) 
Leverage 0.32***(6.50) 0.32***(6.39) 0.32***(6.41) 
LDebt 0.26***(11.90) 0.26***(12.20) 0.26***(12.21) 
Tangibility -0.42***(-11.29) -0.40***(-10.81) -0.40***(-10.77) 
Liquidity -0.18***(-3.09) -0.09(-1.52) -0.09(-1.49) 
Constant 2.53***(17.15) 2.68***(18.02) 2.45***(16.24) 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.35 0.36 0.36 
Observations 3194 3194 3194 
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the standard error with small-sample correction.  
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.2.2 Two-tier board structure and the use of collateral 
Table 6 provides the results of the collateral equation from our simultaneous equation system 
on the association between a two-tier board structure and the use of collateral. In first three 
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columns, we examine the effect of proxies for the board of directors on the use of collateral. 
In particular, the estimated coefficients of Board and Duality are positive and statistically 
significant (t-values are 2.34 and 2.77, respectively), and significantly negative for Indep (t-
value is -2.05). The positive signs on Board and Duality indicate that firms with a larger 
board or dual CEO/chairman are more likely to pledge collateral in their loan contracts; while 
the negative sign on Indep indicates that firms with more independent directors are less likely 
to use collateral. We also observe that the estimated coefficients of Board*NonSOE and 
Duality*NonSOE are negative, and those for Indep*NonSOE are positive. These results 
support hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c, and are consistent with our arguments that larger 
boards and dual CEO/chairman are associated with lower monitoring effectiveness of boards 
of directors, and that independent directors are able to exert an autonomous monitoring 
function and improve the corporate governance of firms; and that these effects are more 
pronounced in SOEs. Thus, banks are likely to reward borrowers with better governance by 
lowering collateral requirements. The result regarding the role of independent directors also 
corroborates the recent evidence provided by Liu et al. (2015), that board independence can 
improve firm performance in Chinese SOEs through effective monitoring.      
Table 6. Effect of two-tier board structure on the use of collateral 
Dependent variable Collateralized loan ratio 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Board 0.06** 
(2.34) 




    -0.08** 
(-2.26) 
Indep  -0.09** 
(-2.05) 
   -0.09** 
(-1.97) 
Indep*NonSOE  0.06* 
(1.89) 
   0.07** 
(2.06) 
Duality   0.07*** 
(2.77) 
  0.07*** 
(2.67) 
Duality*NonSOE   -0.06* 
(-1.75) 
  -0.06* 
(-1.71) 

























































































































































































Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 
Observations 3194 3194 3194 3194 3194 3194 
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the standard error with small-sample correction.  
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Columns 4 and 5 examine the relationship between the structure of a supervisory board 
and the use of collateral. From these two columns, we observe that the estimated coefficients 
of both SB size and SB expert are negative and significant at the 10% or 5% levels (t-values 
are -2.45 and -1.82), respectively. These coefficients indicate that a larger supervisory board 
and its combined expertise can reduce the use of collateral in loan contracts by Chinese listed 
firms, which is partially consistent with hypotheses H3a and H3b. These results are consistent 
with the argument by Firth et al. (2007a) that larger supervisory boards with professional 
knowledge are effective in monitoring executives and directors, and therefore improve 
corporate governance. In columns 4 and 5, we also observe that the estimated coefficients of 
SB size*NonSOE and SB expert*NonSOE are positive and negative, respectively, suggesting 
that the effect of supervisory board is more pronounced in SOEs, while the effect of 
supervisory board expertise is more pronounced in non-SOEs. 
Although this is inconsistent with our hypothesis H3b, it could be consistent with the 
situation in China: The proposed explanation could be that, in China, non-SOEs usually face 
discrimination in accessing bank loans from state-owned banks (Cull and Xu, 2003; Li et al., 
2008), and so a professional supervisory board may help non-SOEs to improve accounting 
quality and alleviate the credit concern of banks, thus reducing the collateral requirements. 
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The results in the last column, where we consider all variables together, are quantitatively 
similar to those reported in columns 1 to 5.    
The overall results from Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate our main findings, that the 
monitoring effectiveness of ownership and a two-tier board structure varies between SOEs 
and non-SOEs, which can be attributed to different dominant agency problems in these firms. 
Specifically, in SOEs, the controlling shareholder is the government, which is not a real 
person, resulting in an ambiguous identification of ultimate property rights; and managers are 
only the agents, so principal-manager conflicts of interest dominate in SOEs (Fan et al., 
2013). Moreover, as the central government has decentralized decision rights and reduced 
government interference, the government’s power to appoint or vote for directors for SOEs 
has diminished; and both boards of directors and supervisory boards have started to function 
properly to constrain managerial self-dealing, which may well reduce credit risks and the use 
of collateral. However, in non-SOEs, the controlling shareholders hold substantial controlling 
positions in management, so that controlling-minority shareholder conflicts of interest 
dominate in non-SOEs. As controlling shareholders still control the appointment of boards of 
directors and supervisory boards (Chen et al., 2006), monitoring by other block shareholders 
will be effective in reducing expropriation by controlling shareholders, and their influence 
becomes more significant for non-SOEs relative to SOEs.  
 
5 Additional tests  
5.1 Identity of controlling shareholders and the use of collateral 
The previous sections differentiate firms as either SOEs or non-SOEs; and this may raise 
additional concerns about the identity of controlling shareholders for both SOEs and non-
SOEs. On the one hand, the controlling shareholder of SOEs can be either the central 
government or local governments, which have different objectives. Specifically, central SOEs 
aim to maintain control over key industries and guarantee the safety of the national economy, 
while local SOEs aim to increase local GDP and reduce local unemployment (Jin et al., 
2005). Chen et al. (2009) also argue that central SOEs are subject to stricter monitoring from 
the government compared with local SOEs. To examine the use of collateral between these 
two types of firms empirically, we include a dummy variable SOECG, which equals 1 for 
central SOEs and 0 for local SOEs, into the collateral equation; and estimate equations using 
the SOE subsample only. The results are reported in column 1 of Table 7.  
On the other hand, for non-SOEs, the incentive of controlling shareholders to expropriate 
other investors may vary across different types of large owners (Lin et al., 2011). Firstly, 
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within the sample of our non-SOEs, there are 4% (57) firm-year observations that are widely 
held ownership firms. As no shareholder holds controlling positions, the incentive for 
expropriation in these firms may be weak, compared with the incentive for controlling 
shareholders. We thus re-estimate our baseline model by including a controlling shareholder 
identity dummy (Controlling). Secondly, for non-SOEs, the controlling shareholders can be 
divided into the following groups: family or individuals; financial institutions; and collective 
control. If the controlling shareholder is a financial institution or a collective, the private 
benefits of control are diluted among many independent owners; and as a result the 
controlling shareholder’s incentive for tunnelling may be weak. If the controlling shareholder 
is an individual or a family, they could have a stronger incentive for expropriation, as the 
dilution of private benefits is not a problem (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Ellul et al., 2007). 
Thus, we examine whether the use of collateral is even higher for particular types of 
controlling shareholders of non-SOEs. Empirically, we include controlling shareholder type 
identity (Family, Collective, Financial) into our baseline model, and run the regressions for 
the non-SOE subsamples and report the results in the last two columns of Table 7 (we only 
report the key variables that are of interest to us). 
Table 7. Controlling shareholder identity and the use of collateral 
Dependent variable Collateralized loan ratio 
 1.SOE subsample 2.Non-SOE subsample 3.Non-SOE subsample 
SOECG -0.04***(-2.74)   
Controlling  0.04***(2.95)  
Family   0.05**(2.09) 
Collective   0.03(1.13) 
Financial   0.01(0.38) 
Control variables include all corporate governance related variables and the other control variables that we used 
in previous tables 
Adjusted R
2
 0.30 0.36 0.37 
Observations 1778 1416 1416 
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the standard error with small-sample correction.   
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
As can be seen in the first column, the coefficient of SOECG is -0.04 and significant at 
the 1% level (t-value is -2.74). This result indicates that central SOEs place less collateral in 
their loan contracts compared with local SOEs. As can be seen in the last two columns, the 
estimated coefficient of Controlling is 0.04 and significant at the 1% level (t-value is 2.95), 
indicating that, compared with widely held firms, the presence of controlling shareholders is 
associated with higher use of collateral. In the last column, we find that the estimated 
coefficient of Family is significantly positive, while the coefficients of both Collective and 
Financial are insignificant. These results imply that, among different types of non-SOE 
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owners, family (individual)-controlled firms are more likely to be required to pledge 
collateral compared with other types of firms.  
 
5.2 Robustness check 
Though we have addressed the issue of reverse causality using the simultaneous equation 
system, we may still face the issue of endogeneity due to unobserved time-invariant 
characteristics. To further address this issue and check the robustness of our main results, we 
estimate the collateral equation, which includes all of our key variables together, using the 
firm fixed effect model and system GMM; and report the results in Table 8. As can be seen, 
the results are broadly consistent with our results from previous tables. Specifically, for 
system GMM estimation, we also conduct the Hansen over-identification test and report the 
J-statistics (p-value). The J-statistics follow the Chi-square (
2
) distribution under the null 
hypothesis that the instruments we use are exogenous. Table 8 shows that the p-value is 0.57 
larger than 0.1, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Moreover, AR(1) and 
AR(2) tests suggest that residuals are correlated in the first differences, but are not correlated 
in the second differences. These tests indicate the validity of our system GMM estimation. 
These results further confirm the findings from the preceding regression analyses. 
In addition, we also notice that our main results may suffer the issue of selection bias, 
because it can be argued that the results that SOEs have a lower collateralized loan ratio 
could be due to the fact that banks are inclined to lend to SOEs so that SOEs receive more 
bank loans. Though we have presented consistent and robust results with alternative 
specifications that can address endogeneity to a large extent, we offer the caveat that we are 
not able to rule out the endogeneity issue completely, and thus caution should be exercised 
when interpreting our results. 
Table 8. Effect of ownership structure and corporate governance on the use of collateral: Firm fixed-
effects and System GMM  
 1.Firm fixed-effects 2.System GMM 
Board 0.09**(2.30) 0.16**(2.07) 
Indep -0.02(-0.57) -0.23***(-5.10) 
Duality 0.08**(2.43) 0.03(1.22) 
SB size -0.07**(-2.09) -0.03**(-2.16) 
SB expertise -0.06*(-1.73) -0.04*(-1.91) 
NonSOE 0.02(0.45) 0.06(0.17) 
Top2_10 -0.19**(-2.27) -0.47***(-4.09) 
Excess 0.02*(1.74) 0.01***(7.13) 
Hansen test (p-value)  0.57 
AR (1) (p-value)  0.00 
AR (2) (p-value)  0.47 
Adjusted R
2
 0.12  
Observations 3194 2052 
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Note: all control variables are also included in both regressions, and the lagged dependent variable is also 
included in the system GMM regression.  
In the fixed-effect regression, t-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the robust standard error, clustered 
by the firm. In the system GMM regressions, t-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the two-step robust, 
firm-clustered standard errors with small-sample correction. 
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
5.3 Alternative measurements and additional concern 
Our next test relates to alternative measurements. Larger firms may have more directors on 
boards and supervisory boards; and thus we apply two alternative variables in the regression 
for a robustness check. In particular, the new variables are defined as the ratio of the log of 
board size and supervisory board size to the log of total firm assets. We also redefine our 
Excess and Top2_10 variables, and create two new variables, Excess_dummy and 
Top2_10_dummy, which are dummy variables, equal to 1 if a firm has a control-ownership 
wedge or other large shareholders, and 0 otherwise. The results in column 1 of Table 9 show 
that using these alternative variables does not change the quality of the findings or the 
explanatory power of the model. In the untabulated analysis, we also use a Herfindahl index 
(HERF) of the second to the tenth largest shareholdings to capture the internal governance of 
other large shareholders. HERF is defined as the sum of the squares of the proportional 
shareholdings of the second to the tenth largest shareholders in the company; and the results 
remain unchanged. We also reclassify the variable Duality, by including those CEOs who are 
also vice-chairman or director. This alternative definition of duality yields similar results to 
those already reported when using the original definition.  
Table 9. Alternative measures 
 1.Alternative variables 2.Ordered logit model 
Board
 a
 0.12**(2.50) 0.02**(2.44) 
Indep -0.07*(-1.91) -0.19**(-2.10) 
Duality 0.04**(2.05) 0.07*(1.69) 
SB size
 a
 -0.22*(-1.95) -0.03**(-2.55) 
SB expertise -0.06**(-2.11) -0.10**(-2.38) 
NonSOE 0.17***(11.09) 0.40***(10.73) 
Excess_dummy 0.02**(2.37) 0.10**(2.06) 
Top2_10_dummy -0.07***(-5.19) -0.16***(-4.60) 
Control variables include cash flow rights, guarantee, firm size, AE, B/M, ROA, Leverage, LDebt, Tangibility, 
Liquidity, industry and year fixed effects 
Adjusted R
2
 0.37 0.37 
Observations 3194 3194 
a
 These variables are redefined in this regression analysis. In particular, Board is defined as the ratio of the log 
of the total number of directors on the board to the log of firm total assets; SB size is defined as the ratio of the 
log of the total number of directors on the supervisory board to the log of firm total assets; Excess_dummy is 
defined as a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm has a control-ownership wedge and 0 otherwise; and 
Top2_10_dummy is defined as a dummy variable if the firm has other large shareholders and 0 otherwise.   
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the standard error with small-sample correction.   
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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We also use an alternative measure for collateral and construct ranks for the use of 
collateral, which can be based on 25 percentiles of the collateral variable. Hence, the 
continuous measure of the collateralized loan ratio is transformed into an ordinal variable 
with four ranks. To analyse a ranked dependent variable, we apply the Ordered Logit 
approach. Column 2 shows the result of the Ordered Logit models. The regression results are 
similar to those reported in previous tables, which suggests that the results are robust for the 
alternative specification. 
Existing studies have also pointed out that board size and ownership structure exhibit a 
non-linear relationship with firm value and earnings management (Yermack, 1996; Ding et 
al., 2007); and thus board size and ownership by other large shareholders may demonstrate a 
non-linear shape with the use of collateral. In order to verify this concern, we have re-
estimated our main regression by including square terms of ownership structure and board 
size attributes separately. From the results (unreported here), we find that the estimated 
coefficients on the square terms are all insignificant, indicating that there does not exist any 
significant non-linear relationship between corporate governance, ownership, and the use of 
collateral.  
 
5.4 Corporate governance, related party transaction, and credit risks 
In the previous section, we found corporate governance to be an important determinant of the 
use of collateral. Our main conjecture is that good corporate governance is effective in 
alleviating expropriation by controlling shareholders and reducing firm credit risks, and in 
turn reduces collateral requirements by banks. However, although we have used excess 
control rights as the proxy for expropriation in the previous section and investigated its 
influence on the use of collateral, we have not provided any direct evidence relating to the 
above relationship between corporate governance and expropriation. Therefore, in this 
section, we present the results of more direct tests of these predictions by estimating the 
effects of corporate governance on more direct measures of expropriation. The first measure 
of expropriation is intercorporate loans (also called funds occupation), which is a primary 
tool used by controlling shareholders for tunnelling. Following Jiang et al. (2010), other 
receivables to total assets (ORECTA) are used to measure intercorporate loans to controlling 
shareholders.  
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In China, listed firms are required to disclose the amount of transactions between related 
parties in their financial statements
10
. Following Cheung et al. (2006), Jian and Wong (2010) 
and Huyghebaert and Wang (2012), we also choose to use the related party transactions 
(RPTs) as an alternative measure for expropriation by controlling shareholders.  
In the first column of Table 10, whether better corporate governance helps a firm prevent 
tunnelling is tested by using the other receivables deflated by total assets (ORECTA) as the 
dependent variable to measure tunnelling. The first regression shows that these variables of 
governance show expected coefficients similar to those reported previously, indicating that 
good governance indeed prevents tunnelling. For example, the estimated coefficient of Board 
is 0.003, significant at the 10% level (t-value is 1.83), indicating that larger board size is less 
effective in constraining expropriation by controlling shareholders. We also observe that 
other corporate governance variables influence expropriation, consistent with their effects on 
the use of collateral in previous tables (except that the effect of Duality becomes 
insignificant). This finding, that governance helps a firm to prevent tunnelling through 
intercorporate loans, may partially explain why such governance affords firms certain 
advantages in reducing the use of collateral.  
Table 10. Corporate governance, related party transaction and credit risks 
Dependent variable 1.ORECTA 2.RPTs 3.ST status 
Board 0.003*(1.83) 0.01**(2.32) 0.02**(2.32) 
Indep -0.003**(-2.01) -0.02**(-2.07) -0.02(-1.60) 
Duality 0.006(0.38) 0.09**(2.56) 0.01**(1.99) 
SB size -0.010**(-2.15) -0.01(-1.30) -0.03*(-1.93) 
SB expertise -0.002*(-1.74) -0.02*(-1.83) -0.02**(-2.42) 
NonSOE 0.002(1.20) 0.02(1.28) 0.09*(1.88) 
Excess 0.09**(2.03) 0.03***(4.55) 0.01***(4.59) 
Top2_10 0.03(0.18) -0.23***(-4.33) -0.17***(-8.91) 





 0.08 0.10 0.05 
Observations 3194 3194 3194 
T-statistics/Z-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the standard error with small-sample correction.   
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Column 2 reports the empirical findings where related party transactions are employed as 
the dependent variables. Overall, the main findings are largely consistent with previous 
results that good corporate governance is able to mitigate the incentives for expropriation by 
controlling shareholders. For example, we observe that board size is positively related to 
RPTs, indicating that expropriation could be mitigated by reducing the board size.  
                                                          
10 Detailed disclosures are required within two working days after signing the contract if, for one party, the total amount of transactions 
between related parties is larger than 1,000,000 Renminbi (RMB) or 0.5 per cent of audited net assets, whichever is higher. Moreover, these 
dealings have to be approved by the general meeting of shareholders as soon as their size exceeds 10,000,000 RMB or 5% of audited net 
assets. 
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Column 3 reports the empirical results regarding the connection between corporate 
governance and credit risks. Perhaps the ideal proxy for credit risks is the credit ratings of the 
bonds issued. However, we only have limited information on credit ratings of the bonds 
issued by our sample firms. Instead, we use the probability of being flagged with ST (ST*) in 
subsequent years as the approximate proxy for credit risks
11
, following Qian and Yeung 
(2015). The signs of our key variables are consistent with those reported in previous tables, 
indicating that better corporate governance is able to reduce the credit risks.    
 
6 Conclusions 
Using a sample of China’s listed firms between 2007 and 2009, we investigated the effect of 
ownership and corporate governance on the firms’ use of collateral in their loan contracts. 
We find that the use of collateral is higher for firms in which controlling shareholders have 
larger excess control rights or a lower proportion of ownership held by other large 
shareholders; which is more amplified in non-SOEs. Further analysis shows that governance 
by two-tier boards also matters for firms’ use of collateral. In particular, we find that the use 
of collateral is higher for firms with larger board size, fewer independent directors, duality of 
CEO and chairman, and smaller supervisory board size; and that this is more pronounced in 
SOEs. In addition, the benefits of employing professional experts on the supervisory board 
are more significant for non-SOEs. Our results are robust to endogeneity using different 
estimation methods, including the simultaneous equation system, firm fixed effect model, and 
system GMM. Nevertheless, we raise the caveat that we cannot rule out endogeneity 
completely. Overall, these results suggest that the effectiveness of corporate governance on 
reducing the use of collateral depends on the type of controlling shareholders, as well as  the 
dominating agency problem.  
From the perspective of policy makers, the results suggest that listed firms should 
encourage other large shareholders to increase their ownership or reduce the excess control 
rights by the controlling shareholders, in exchange for more favourable loan contracts. The 
empirical results in this research also echo the measures taken by the authorities to encourage 
better corporate governance of listed firms by recommending changes in the two-tier board 
structure, which is of great importance in protecting banks. For example, we provide support 
for recent regulatory and listing requirements (see the newly amended Chinese Corporate 
                                                          
11
 ST stands for “Special Treatment”, which is an indication of listed firms’ irregular financial statements. In 
particular, a listed firm is flagged with ST if it has negative profits for two consecutive years. This measure can 
indicate that a firm has a higher credit risk. 
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Law 2005) concerning more actively involved and professional boards of supervisors, with 






Estimation results of other equations from the simultaneous equation system (corresponding to the 
collateral equation in column 3 of Table 6) 







































































































     
Firm age  0.03** 
(2.16) 
    
Industry average 
excess control rights 
  0.18** 
(2.52) 




   0.68** 
(2.19) 
  
Lagged Guarantee     0.06** 
(1.99) 
 




0.67 0.51 0.43 0.50 0.41 0.33 
Adjusted R
2
 0.23 0.31 0.23 0.27 0.32 0.26 
Observations 3194 3194 3194 3194 3194 3194 
The table reports the estimation results of other equations of the simultaneous equation system, corresponding to 
the collateral equation in column 3 of Table 6. Only key variables as well as the instrument variables are 
reported. P-values are also reported for over-identification tests for examining the exogeneity of instrument 
variables. T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the standard error with small-sample correction.  
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